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Abstract 
This paper examines fiscal sustainability in an inflationary environment, particularly the 
interrelation between government debt and inflation. A model that explicitly incorporates the 
political utility/objective function of government is constructed. The government’s borrowing 
behavior and inflation are determined through the simultaneous optimization of government and 
households. The sustainable fiscal debt in an inflationary environment was found to equal the 
present value of primary balances discounted by the time preference rate of government, not by 
the interest rate. This result raises the question of whether it is appropriate to apply the fiscal 
sustainability test of Hamilton and Flavin to high inflation countries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     The argument that inflation will eventually accelerate if the government budget deficit 
increases greatly has an intuitive appeal. Many economists might accept the notion that 
unrestrained government borrowing will increase prices, a concept which implies that fiscal 
sustainability and inflation interact with one another. Hence, it appears that careful 
consideration must be given to the interrelation between government debt and inflation when 
analyzing fiscal sustainability. However, much of the literature on fiscal sustainability has not 
sufficiently considered the interrelation between them and has instead directed attention only to 
economic activities in the real term.1 Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Bohn (1995), two of the 
most prominent papers in this field, are not exceptions: they hardly mention the interrelation 
between government debt and inflation. 
     On the other hand, the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) directly examines the 
interrelation between government debt and inflation ― more correctly, the interrelation between 
government debt and the price level.2 Although the focal point of the FTPL is not fiscal 
sustainability but price level, the FTPL also has an important implication on fiscal sustainability. 
According to the FTPL, fiscal sustainability can always be held because a government behaves 
so as to hold it in case of the Ricardian regime and households adjust prices so as to hold it in 
case of the non-Ricardian regime. Thus, the FTPL implies that any fiscal policy can be 
sustainable. Buiter (2002, 2004) criticizes the FTPL on this very point. He has denounced the 
FTPL as false because if default is ruled out, budget constraints must always be satisfied by any 
economic agent. This problem seems to be rooted in the very nature of the FTPL such that the 
concept of non-Ricardian fiscal policy is too general and allows many absurd fiscal policies. 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988), Wilcox (1989), Blanchard, Chouraqui, 
Hagemann, and Sartor (1990), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Haug (1991), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), and Bohn (1995). 
2 See, for example, Leeper (1991), Sims (1994, 1998, 2001), Woodford (1995, 2001), or Cochrane (1998a, 1998b, 
2000). 
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The FTPL implicitly assumes that, in case of the non-Ricardian regime, households are totally 
passive and obey even apparently absurd fiscal policies. In other words, even though fiscal 
policies are unquestionably absurd, households will surely buy the bonds issued by the 
government that implements the unquestionably absurd fiscal policies and adjust prices 
accordingly. Because households are assumed to follow the government in any situation, any 
fiscal policy can be sustainable. In actuality, households do not appear so passive as to obey a 
government that implements apparently absurd fiscal policies, buy the bonds issued by such an 
absurd government, and adjust prices accordingly. As a result, the FTPL has been regarded as a 
useless gimmick which vaguely argues a curious possibility of fiscal sustainability. 
     However, many economists seem to agree that the central idea of the FTPL is still 
compelling although its arguments have not necessarily been sufficiently successful. To 
revitalize this compelling idea, it seems necessary to sort out non-absurd fiscal policies from 
absurd fiscal policies because an important drawback of the FTPL is that it allows many 
apparently absurd fiscal policies. It is necessary therefore to examine fiscal policies 
implemented by a government that considers household’s responses when it pursues its 
objectives. The fiscal policies implemented by this kind of government will not be regarded as 
absurd because it considers households’ rational responses carefully and thus households who 
know the careful behavior of government will obey the fiscal policies implemented by the 
government and adjust prices accordingly. That is, neither government nor households force the 
other to obey, but both government and households pursue their own objectives while 
simultaneously considering each other’s responses. In case of these non-absurd fiscal policies, 
the mechanism argued in the FTPL may work to some extent and play an important role for 
fiscal sustainability as well as inflation. We therefore need a model of such a government to 
revitalize the compelling idea of the FTPL. 
     The purpose of my paper is to solve the aforementioned problems with the conventional 
theory of fiscal sustainability and the FTPL and to present an explanation for fiscal 
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sustainability in an inflationary environment. The drawbacks of both theories suggest that it is 
necessary to construct a model that incorporates the government’s non-absurd borrowing 
behavior to analyze fiscal sustainability in an inflationary environment. I construct such a model 
in this paper.  
     The model assumes a Leviathan government.3 As is known well, there are two extremely 
different views regarding government behavior—the Leviathan view and the benevolent view. 
In the Leviathan view, a government gives priority to pursuing its objectives. In the benevolent 
view, a government maximizes utility the same as a representative household does. Because the 
fiscal and monetary policies of a benevolent government are practically under the control of the 
representative household, the optimal behavior of a benevolent government is to supply money 
to the representative household’s saturation point and keep the deflation rate equal to the real 
interest rate (the Friedman rule).4 In the benevolent view, therefore, inflation is basically 
unrelated to government fiscal behavior. Hence, a model based on the benevolent view appears 
inappropriate for the purpose of an analysis of fiscal sustainability in an inflationary 
environment that focuses on the interrelation between a government’s borrowing behavior and 
inflation. On the other hand, it is not necessarily guaranteed that the Leviathan government’s 
behavior has no influence on the development of inflation because the fiscal and monetary 
policies of a Leviathan government are not perfectly under the control of the representative 
household. I therefore assume a Leviathan government in this model. A Leviathan government 
pursues its political objectives and does not necessarily pursue the economic objectives of the 
representative household. It should be noted, however, that people do not regard the government 
as absurd. Rather, the majority of people support the government because people choose a 
government not only from an economic point of view but also from a political point of view. In 
this sense, the Leviathan government argued here is an economically Leviathan government that 
                                                          
3 The most prominent reference of Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
4 See Friedman (1969). 
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reflects the political desire of the people.5 
    An important property of the model is that the utility/objective function of government is 
explicitly incorporated. The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of 
government expenditure, tax revenue, or related government activities in the utility/objective 
function of government.6 The behavior of government therefore is determined through the 
optimization of its utility/objective function subject to the budget constraint and thus apparently 
absurd fiscal policies will be removed in the model. Both the Leviathan government and the 
representative household optimize expected utility simultaneously. Neither the Leviathan 
government that represents the political desire of people nor the representative household that 
represents the economic desire of people dominates because political and economic desires are 
balanced. Hence, unlike the conventional theory on fiscal sustainability, fiscal sustainability and 
inflation interact with one another in the model. In addition, it should be stressed that a 
Leviathan government maximizes its utility/objective function under the constraint of deficit 
financing. Even a Leviathan government must obey the budget constraint at any time. In this 
sense, the budget constraint is still a constraint in the optimization problem of government as the 
opponents of the FTPL contend it must be. As a whole, the nature of the model is fundamentally 
different from that of the models based on either the conventional theory on fiscal sustainability 
or the FTPL because the model considers both economic and political utility. This model, 
therefore, satisfies the aforementioned requirement that it explicitly incorporate the 
government’s non-absurd borrowing behavior such that a government spends and borrows 
money considering households’ responses.  
     Several important results are obtained by the model. First, the sustainable fiscal debt in an 
inflationary environment is equal to the present value of primary balances discounted by the 
time preference rate of government, less than the value discounted by the interest rate in 
                                                          
5 See the literature on the public choice. 
6 See, for example, Edwards and Keen (1996). 
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Hamilton and Flavin (1986). The problem of the discount factor may be very important when 
this kind of test is applied to some developing countries where high inflation is endemic. 
Secondly, the model indicates that, because the level of government debt and the inflation 
acceleration rate commonly depend on the time preference rate of government, the relation 
between the level of government debt and the inflation rate is not linear. Rather, it is much more 
complex. Many empirical studies indicate that the relation between the level of government debt 
and the inflation rate is unclear and inconclusive.7 This inconclusiveness may be due to the 
incorrect assumption that the relation between them is linear. In addition, the model indicates 
that a government gains by deliberately making inflation accelerate because steady state primary 
balance becomes smaller. This mechanism may tempt a government into accelerating inflation 
to lessen the burden of its debts.  
     The paper is organized as follows. A model that explicitly incorporates the government’s 
borrowing behavior is constructed in section II. The model shows that the behavior of 
government is neither Ricardian nor non-Ricardian, but that the government behavior is optimal 
and consistent with both the budget constraint and the transversality condition. In section III, the 
model is used to show that the sustainable fiscal debt in an inflationary environment is equal to 
the present value of primary balances discounted by the time preference rate of government. In 
section IV, the appropriateness of the fiscal sustainability test developed by Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986) is questioned, particularly as it applies to some developing countries where high 
inflation is still endemic. Concluding remarks are offered in section V. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
1. An economically Leviathan government  
     A model that explicitly incorporates the government’s non-absurd borrowing behavior is 
                                                          
7 See, for example,  Karras (1994), Darrat (2000), or Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (2002). 
 6
constructed so as to analyze fiscal sustainability in an inflationary environment. Since the 
government’s borrowing activity is not isolated from various other activities of government, the 
overall nature of government behavior is examined. As Alesina and Cukierman (1990) argue, 
politicians are generally motivated by two desires: they want to hold office as long as possible 
and they have preferences on policy issues.8 The former motive is the essence of the benevolent 
view of government and the latter motive is the essence of the Leviathan view of government, 
most prominently that of Brennan and Buchanan (1980). From the economic point of view, a 
benevolent government maximizes the expected utility of the representative household, but a 
Leviathan government does not. The expenditure of benevolent government is a tool to 
maximize the economic utility of the representative household. The expenditure of a Leviathan 
government is not a tool to maximize the economic utility of the representative household; 
rather, it is a tool to achieve its own objectives. Unlike a benevolent government, a Leviathan 
government is therefore not managed by politically neutral bureaucrats who are obligated to 
mechanically maximize the expected economic utility of the representative household in any 
time. It is instead managed by politicians who have strong wills to achieve their own objectives 
(e.g., strengthening national security, improving social welfare, or enhancing national prestige) 
by all means.9 
     Is it possible for such a Leviathan government to hold office for a long period? It is 
possible if economic and political points of view are considered. The majority of people will 
support a Leviathan government even though they know that the government does not 
                                                          
8 Because of the latter motive, a complete policy convergence may not be the electoral equilibrium. See the literature 
on the policy convergence, most of which are based upon Downs (1957).  
9 The behavior of a government assumed in the FTPL reflects an aspect of the Leviathan government. Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2000) argues that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies contemplated in the Ramsey 
literature, in which governments are viewed as selecting their policies and committing themselves to those policies in 
advance of prices being determined in markets. 
 7
necessarily pursue only the economic objective of the representative household because people 
choose a government from both economic and political points of view.10 From the political 
point of view, households are not necessarily represented by the same the representative 
household usually presumed in the literature on economics. A government is generally chosen 
by the median of households under a proportional representation system, but the representative 
household that is usually presumed in the literature on economics is basically the mean 
household.11 Thereby, a household represented from the economic point of view is not usually 
identical to a household represented from the political point of view. In other words, the 
Leviathan government argued here is an economically Leviathan government that maximizes 
the political utility of people while the standard economically benevolent government 
maximizes the economic utility of people.  
     An important difference between economically benevolent and Leviathan governments is 
that the fiscal and monetary policies of a benevolent government are practically under the 
control of the representative household but those of a Leviathan government are not. Because of 
this property, a benevolent government is obligated to supply money up to the representative 
household’s saturation point and to keep the deflation rate equal to the real interest rate, which 
is the well-known Friedman rule.12 Hence, a constant deflation rate continues in a model in 
which a government is assumed to be purely economically benevolent; thus, in the benevolent 
view, inflation is basically unrelated to a government’s fiscal behavior. On the other hand, 
because the fiscal and monetary policies of a Leviathan government are not perfectly under the 
control of the representative household, it is not necessarily guaranteed that the Leviathan 
government’s fiscal behavior has no influence on the development of inflation. 
                                                          
10 See the literature on the public choice. 
11 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., also Downs 1957), and also see the literature on the delay in 
reforms (e.g., Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
12 See Friedman (1969). 
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     The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government expenditure, 
tax revenue, or related government activities in the utility/objective function of government, 
unlike the benevolent view, which requires that the objective function of government is identical 
to the utility function of the representative household.13 A Leviathan government derives 
political utility from government expenditure for its political purposes. Hence, the larger the 
expenditure is, the happier the Leviathan government is. For instance, if a government regards 
that the most important political issue is national security, the expenditure on defense will be 
increased greatly. If the improvement of social welfare is the top priority for a government, the 
expenditure on social welfare will be increased dramatically. There may be a government that 
gives priority to long-term economic development, and the expenditure on social infrastructure 
will be increased significantly. On the other hand, a Leviathan government knows that raising 
tax rates will provoke people’s antipathy and reduce the probability of being reelected, which 
makes the government uncomfortable because it expects that if it loses power it cannot expend 
money for its political purposes anymore. Hence, a Leviathan government will regard taxes as 
necessary costs to obtain freedom of expenditure for its political purposes. In sum, a Leviathan 
government derives political utility from the expenditure that makes its ideological policies 
achievable and political disutility from the taxes that are necessary costs to achieve its 
ideological policies.  
     The above arguments about economically Leviathan government suggest that the political 
utility function that describes the political preference of a Leviathan government can be 
expressed as ( )ttG xgu , ,14 where 
t
t
t p
Gg =  is the real government expenditure, 
t
t
t p
Xx = is 
                                                          
13 See, for example, Edwards and Keen (1996). 
14 It may be possible to assume that a government is partially benevolent. In this case, the political utility function of 
government can be assumed to be ( )ttttG lcxgu ,,,  where tc  is the real consumption and tl  is the leisure 
hours of the representative household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, government policies do not affect the 
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the real tax revenue of government in period t while Gt is the nominal government expenditure, 
Xt is the nominal tax revenue, and pt is the price level in period t. In addition, it can be assumed 
by the abovementioned arguments that 0>∂
∂
t
G
g
u , 02
2
<∂
∂
t
G
g
u , 0<∂
∂
t
G
x
u  and 02
2
>∂
∂
t
G
x
u . The 
expenditure and taxes in the political utility function of the government is analogous to the 
consumption and labor hours in the economic utility function of the household. As the 
consumption and labor hours are both control variables, the government’s expenditure and tax 
revenue are both control variables. A Leviathan government maximizes its political utility under 
the constraint of deficit financing. Even a Leviathan government must obey the budget 
constraint at any time. In this sense, the budget constraint is still a constraint in the optimization 
problem of government as the opponents of the FTPL contend it to be. As a whole, the problem 
an economically Leviathan government should solve is a maximization problem of its expected 
political utility subject to the budget constraint. 
 
2. The model 
     It is first assumed in the model that a government is an economically Leviathan 
government because, as was argued previously, the benevolent view implies that inflation is 
unrelated to government fiscal behavior. On the basis of the above arguments, the political 
utility function of the Leviathan government is assumed to be ( )ttG xgu , , where 0>∂
∂
t
G
g
u , 
02
2
<∂
∂
t
G
g
u , 0<∂
∂
t
G
x
u , and 02
2
>∂
∂
t
G
x
u . All variables are expressed in per capita terms. It is 
assumed that Gu is a constant relative risk aversion utility function. The government’s rate of 
time preference is Gθ . The tax is assumed to be lump sum. The budget constraint of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
steady state consumption and leisure hours. Hence, the political utility function can be assumed to be ( )ttG xgu , . 
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government is  
tttttt SXGRBB −−+=&  
where Bt is the accumulated nominal government bonds, Rt is the nominal interest rate for 
government bonds, and St is the nominal amount of seigniorage in period t. Rt is composed of 
the real interest rate rt and the expected change of bonds’ price by inflation e tbπ ,  such that 
e
tbtt πrR ,+= . Let 
t
t
t p
Bb =  and 
t
t
t p
Ss = ; 
t
t
t p
p
π
&=  is the inflation rate in period t. By 
dividing by pt, the budget constraint is transformed to  
ttttt
t
t sxgRb
p
B −−+=& , 
which is equivalent to  
( ) tttttttttttttt sxgπRbπbsxgRbb −−+−=−−−+=& . 
Hence, the optimization problem of the government is  
Max ( ) ( )dttθxguE GttG −∫ ∞ exp,00  
subject to  
( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=& . 
     On the other hand, a representative household maximizes the following expected 
economic utility: 
Max ( ) ( )dttθcuE PtP −∫∞ exp00  
where Pu  and Pθ  are the economic utility function and the rate of time preference of the 
representative household, subject to the following constraint:  
( ) tttt gckfk −−=& , 
where ( )•f  is the production function, tk  is the real capital per capita, and tc  is the real 
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consumption per capita.15 The constraint means that the output ( )tkf  in each period is 
demanded for private consumption ct, private investment tk& , and government expenditure gt. 
Government expenditure gt is an exogenous variable for the representative household because 
the government is Leviathan. It is assumed that 0>′Pu , 0<″Pu , and the population is 
constant. 
     An important property of this model is that neither the government nor the representative 
household dominates the other, but both equally pursue their own objectives while 
simultaneously considering each other’s response. The government maximizes its expected 
political utility considering the response of the representative household reflected in Rt in its 
budget constraint, and the representative household maximizes its expected economic utility 
considering the response of government reflected in gt in its budget constraint.  
     Note that the time preference rate of government Gθ  is not necessarily identical to the 
time preference rate of the representative household Pθ . This property of heterogeneity plays 
an important role later in this study. The reasons why the rates of time preference are different 
between government and the representative household can be summed up as follows: (i) a 
government is chosen from among many political parties not only from an economic point of 
view but also from a political one while the time preference rate of the representative household 
is related only to economic activities and not to political activities; (ii) a government is usually 
chosen by the median of households under a proportional representation system and thus the 
converged policy reflects the median voter—not the mean voter—while a representative 
household is basically the mean household;16 (iii) even though people want to choose a party 
that has the same time preference rate as the representative household, those of the chosen party 
                                                          
15 The constraint is equivalent to ( ) ( )ttttttttt πRbsxbckfk −+−−−−= && . 
16 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., also Downs 1957), and also see the literature on the delay in 
reforms (e.g., Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
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may differ from those of the representative household owing to errors in expectations;17 and 
(iv) current voters cannot bind the choices of future voters and thus if current voters are aware 
of this possibility, they may vote more myopically compared to their own rates of impatience in 
private economic activities.18 Hence, it seems that the rates of time preference of government 
and the representative household are usually heterogeneous. It should be also noted, however, 
that even though the rates of time preference are heterogeneous, a Leviathan government 
behaves based only on its own time preference rate without hesitation although it behaves 
carefully considering households’ responses. 
 
3. Neither Ricardian nor non-Ricardian fiscal regime 
     Before examining fiscal sustainability with the model, an important aspect of the model 
must be examined to help understand the analyses on fiscal sustainability presented in the 
following sections. A unique feature of the model is that it explicitly includes the political utility 
function of government; this feature differentiates the model from other models on fiscal 
sustainability. The FTPL and the quantity theory of money on which the conventional theory of 
fiscal sustainability is based do not explicitly assume the political utility function of government. 
Nevertheless, it is easily shown that these theories implicitly assume a common special political 
utility function of government such that ( ) ( )dttθxguE GttG −∫ ∞ exp,00  = constant 
for any gt and xt; thus Gu  = constant. Let Hamiltonian 1H  be  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttttttGttG sxgπRbλtθ,xguH −−+−+−= 11 exp  where tλ1  is a costate variable. The 
optimality conditions are  
(1) 01 =∂
∂
tg
H ,   
                                                          
17 See, for example, Alesina and Cukierman (1990). 
18 See, for example, Tabellini and Alesina (1990). 
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(2) 01 =∂
∂
tx
H ,    
(3) 
t
t
b
H
dt
dλ
∂
∂−= 11 ,     
(4) 
t
t
λ
H
dt
db
1
1
∂
∂−= ,      
(5) 0lim 1 =∞→ ttt bλ .     
If the political utility function of the government is that Gu  = constant, then conditions (1) and 
(2) are 011 =−=∂
∂
t
t
λ
g
H  and 011 ==∂
∂
t
t
λ
x
H  thus 01 =tλ . Thereby, conditions (1) and (2) hold 
for any e tbπ , , πt, gt, xt, and st in any period. In addition, in case of 01 =tλ , condition (3) 
( ) 011 =−−= tttt πRλdt
dλ  holds for any e tbπ , , πt, gt, xt, and st in any period. Hence, the optimality 
conditions are condition (4) and the transversality condition (5). Here, condition (4) is 
equivalent to the budget constraint ( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=& . As a result, if the political 
utility function of the government is a special one such that Gu  = constant, then the optimality 
conditions are (i) the budget constraint ( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=&  and (ii) the 
transversality condition. Needless to say, both the FTPL and the quantity theory of money are 
commonly based upon (i) the budget constraint and (ii) the transversality condition.  
     Because both the FTPL and the quantity theory of money implicitly assume the common 
special political utility function of government such that Gu  = constant, the difference between 
FTPL and the quantity theory of money is merely the difference between interpretations of (i) 
the budget constraint and (ii) the transversality condition. As is known well, two extremely 
different interpretations are possible. Because conditions (1) and (2) hold for any e tbπ , , πt, gt, and 
xt in any period and thus e tbπ , , πt, gt, and xt are indeterminate, exogenously setting either the 
values on prices e tbπ , and πt or the values on government behavior gt and xt is necessary for 
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completing a model based on the FTPL or the quantity theory of money. The former option-- 
prices e tbπ , and πt are assumed to be exogenously given and the government adjusts gt and xt for 
bt not to explode--is called Ricardian. The latter option--the government behavior gt and xt are 
exogenously given and the prices e tbπ , and πt are adjusted for bt not to explode--is called 
non-Ricardian.19 Theoretically both options are equally possible, and it is difficult to judge a 
priori which option is more consistent with the real world.  
     The above result highlights the fundamental difference between the model in this paper 
and the models based on the FTPL or the quantity theory of money. In this model, neither fiscal 
policy nor inflation is indeterminate and must be given ad hoc and exogenously but, as will be 
shown in the following section, both are determined through the simultaneous optimization of 
the government and the representative household. This is in sharp contrast to the FTPL as well 
as the quantity theory of money, which presume that either the Ricardian or the non-Ricardian 
regime is given ad hoc and exogenously. The reason why the FTPL and the quantity theory of 
money need the assumption of an ad hoc and exogenously given fiscal regime is simple: a 
government has a special political utility function, the value of which is constant and does not 
change for any set of values of the government’s control variables. As a result, the optimization 
of government’s utility affects neither fiscal policies nor development of inflation, either of 
which therefore needs to be given exogenously (e.g., Ricardian or non-Ricardian regime). 
Contrarily, it does not matter whether the fiscal regime is Ricardian or non-Ricardian in my 
model because political utility ( )ttG xgu ,  changes as the government maneuvers control 
variables gt and xt in its optimization. The behavior of the government in the model therefore 
indicates neither a Ricardian nor a non-Ricardian regime. Rather, the government behavior is 
                                                          
19 Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) argue that, in the Ricardian regime, the control of money supply on the 
assumption of the quantity theory of money is not sufficient to fix the time path of inflation rate. Traditionally a 
monetarist type rule (e.g., purely speculative time trends in velocity) has been often assumed implicitly. 
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merely optimal and consistent with both the budget constraint and the transversality condition. 
 
III. FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
1. Inflation 
     Because the purpose of this paper is to examine fiscal sustainability in an inflationary 
environment, the nature of inflation in the model is examined before analyzing fiscal 
sustainability. Let Hamiltonian 2H  be ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttttttGttG sxgπRbλtθ,xguH −−+−+−= 22 exp  
where tλ2  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions of the government’s optimization 
problem shown in II. 2. are  
(6) ( ) ( ) tG
t
tt
G
λtθ
g
,xgu
2exp −=−∂
∂ ,  
(7) ( ) ( ) tG
t
tt
G
λtθ
x
,xgu
2exp =−∂
∂ ,     
(8) ( )tttt πRλλ −−= 22& ,   
(9) ( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=& ,       
(10) 0lim 2 =∞→ ttt bλ .       
Combining conditions (6), (7), and (8) yields the following equations:  
( )
( ) te tbtttGt
t
t
tt
G
t
tt
G
t
ππrπRθ
g
g
g
,xgu
g
,xgug
−+=−=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
,
2
2
&  and 
( )
( ) te tbtttGt
t
t
tt
G
t
tt
G
t
ππrπRθ
x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgux
−+=−=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
− ,
2
2
& . 
Because 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
tt
G
t
tt
G
t
g
g
g
,xgu
g
,xgug &  and 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
tt
G
t
tt
G
t
x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgux &  at steady state such that 
0=tg&  and 0=tx& , then te tbtG ππrθ −+= , . Here, by the optimality conditions of the 
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representative household, Pt θr =  at steady state such that 0=tc& , 0=tk&  and 0=tg& . 
Hence t
e
tb
PG ππθθ −+= ,  and thus 
(11) PGt
e
tb θθππ −+=,  
at steady state such that 0=tg& , 0=tx& , 0=tc& , and 0=tk& .   
     Equation (11) is a natural consequence of the simultaneous optimization by a Leviathan 
government and the representative household. What should be stressed is that t
e
tb ππ ≠,  if the 
rates of time preference are heterogeneous between the government and the representative 
household. Some economists may be surprised by the possibility of t
e
tb ππ ≠,  because it has 
been naturally conjectured that t
e
tb ππ =,  under rational expectations. However, this conjecture 
is a simple misunderstanding because, by definition, e tbπ ,  indicates a total price change by 
inflation during a period. On the other hand tπ  indicates the instantaneous rate of inflation at a 
point such that 
t
tht
h
t
t
t p
h
pp
p
p
π
−
==
+
→0lim&  and does not indicate a total general price change by 
inflation during a period. Hence, if tπ  = constant, the equation t
e
tb ππ =,  holds, but if tπ  ≠ 
constant, the equation t
e
tb ππ =,  does not necessarily hold. Equation (11) indicates that the 
equation t
e
tb ππ =,  holds only in a special case such that PG θθ =  (i.e., a homogeneous rate of 
time preference). Because a homogeneous rate of time preference such that PG θθ =  has been 
regarded as naturally prevailing, equation t
e
tb ππ =,  has not been questioned. However, as 
argued above, a homogeneous rate of time preference is not usually guaranteed. If there are 
heterogeneous rates of time preference between the government and the representative 
household such that PG θθ ≠ , equation (11) indicates that equation te tb ππ =,  cannot hold 
anymore.  
     What does equation (11) indicate? It indicates that inflation accelerates/decelerates when 
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the rates of time preference are heterogeneous. The reason for the acceleration/deceleration of 
inflation is simple: by definition, e tbπ ,  indicates a total price change by inflation during a period 
and tπ  indicates the instantaneous rate of inflation at a point. Thereby if tπ  = constant, the 
equation t
e
tb ππ =,  holds and conversely if te tb ππ ≠, , then tπ  ≠ constant. Without the 
acceleration/deceleration of inflation, therefore, equation (11) cannot hold in an economy with 
PG θθ ≠ . That is, inflation accelerates/decelerates as a result of reconciling the contradiction in 
heterogeneous rates of time preference.20  
 
2. The sustainable fiscal debt 
     Much of the sustainability literature since Hamilton and Flavin (1986) defines fiscal 
sustainability as the implementation of a fiscal policy by which the transversality condition is 
satisfied. As in the literature, this paper defines fiscal sustainability also as implementing a 
fiscal policy by which the transversality condition (10) is satisfied. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) 
show that the sustainable fiscal debt is equal to the present value of primary balances discounted 
by the interest rate. On the other hand, Bohn (1995) argues that, in a stochastic environment, the 
sustainable fiscal debt is equal to the present value of primary balances discounted by the 
marginal rate of substitution. In this subsection, I examine the sustainable fiscal debt in an 
inflationary environment. 
     First, the return on government bonds is examined. By equation (11) and assumptions 
(A1) and (A2), PGtttt
e
tbt
t
t v
θθπrRπππdvπ −=−−=−=−∫ + ,1  at steady state. Hence,  
(12) Gtt θπR =−   
at steady state because Pt θr = . Equation (12) indicates that the real return on government 
bonds tt
G
t πRr −=  is equal to the time preference rate of government Gθ  at steady state, (i.e., 
                                                          
20 The model therefore can be used for the analysis of inflation. See, for example, Harashima (2004, 2005). 
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GG
t θr = ). Intuitively the equation GGt θr =  appears quite reasonable because the equation 
GG
t θr =  is analogous to the well-known steady state condition Pt θr =  in the private sector in 
the Ramsey model.  
     By equations (11) and (12), the requirement for satisfying the transversality condition 
(10) is obtained. Substituting equations (11) and (12) into conditions (8) and (9) and solving 
both differential equations yields the equation: ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−−= ∫ #2 1exp Cdtbsxgbλ tttttt  at steady 
state where C# is a certain constant. Thereby, it is necessary to satisfy 0<−− ttt sxg  and 
∞=∫∞→ dtbtt
1lim  for the transversality condition (10) to be held. Here, by condition (9), 
t
tttG
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b −−+=&  at steady state. Hence if 0=−−+=
t
tttG
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady 
state, then tb  is constant and thus ∞=∫∞→ dtbtt
1lim . Thereby, the transversality condition holds. 
However, if 0<−−+=
t
tttG
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then tb  diminishes to zero and the 
transversality condition (10) cannot hold because 0<−− ttt sxg . If 
0>−−+=
t
tttG
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then G
t
t
t
θ
b
b =
∞→
&
lim  and thus tb  increases as 
time passes and ∫ =∞→ G
t
t θ
Cdt
b
##1lim  where C## is a certain constant. The transversality 
condition (10) therefore also cannot hold and thus, if and only if 
t
tttG
b
sxg
θ
−−−=  at 
steady state can the transversality condition (10) 0lim 2 =∞→ ttt bλ  hold. The requirement 
t
tttG
b
sxg
θ
−−−=  indicates that the increase of government debt tGbθ  (i.e., the real return 
on government bonds Gθ  times accumulated debts tb ) should be equal to the primary surplus 
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( )ttt sxg −−−  at steady state. 
     The requirement 
t
tttG
b
sxg
θ
−−−=  also implies that the sustainable fiscal debt in an 
inflationary environment is different from that in a non-inflationary environment that is argued 
in Hamilton and Flavin (1986). The sustainable fiscal debt in Hamilton and Flavin (1986) is 
equal to the present value of primary balances discounted by the interest rate. The present value 
of primary balances at steady state in Hamilton and Flavin (1986) is 
( ) ( ) =−−+− +++−∞∫ djsxgr jtjtjtj0 1  
( ) ( ) =+−−− −∞∫ djrsxg jttt 0 1 =−−− r sxg ttt P ttt θ sxg −−− ; this is the value 
discounted by the interest rate–that is, the value discounted by the time preference rate of the 
representative household. However, the requirement 
t
tttG
b
sxg
θ
−−−=  indicates that the 
sustainable fiscal debt ∗tb  must satisfy the condition 
(13) 
G
ttt
t θ
sxgb −−−=∗ . 
Hence, if PG θθ > , then 
P
ttt
G
ttt
t θ
sxg
θ
sxgb −−−<−−−=∗  and the sustainable fiscal debt ∗tb  
is less than the present value of primary balances discounted by the interest rate 
( ) ( )djsxgr jtjtjtj +++−∞ −−+− ∫0 1 , i.e., ( ) ( )djsxgrb jtjtjtjt +++−∞∗ −−+−< ∫0 1 . 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
1. The problem of discount factor  
     Equation (13) indicates that, in a deterministic but inflationary environment (i.e., 
PG θθ > ), the sustainable fiscal debt is equal to the present value of primary balances 
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discounted by the time preference rate of government and needs to be less than the one 
discounted by the interest rate.21 The sustainable fiscal debt is therefore quite different from 
that in Hamilton and Flavin (1986). An intuitive explanation of this result is that, because the 
inequality PG θθ >  means that the real return on government bonds is larger than the interest 
rate, government debts grow more rapidly and thus the sustainable fiscal debt must be smaller. 
As equation (12) indicates, the real return on government bonds tt
G
t πRr −=  is equal to the 
time preference rate of government at steady state (i.e., GGt θr = ), which is analogous to the 
well-known steady state condition Pt θr =  in the private sector in the Ramsey model, and thus 
the real return on government bonds GGt θr =  is larger than the interest rate Pt θr =  if 
PG θθ > . 
     Nevertheless, if PG θθ =  (i.e, if in a non-inflationary environment), then equation (13) 
also indicates that =−−−=−−−=−−−=∗
r
sxg
θ
sxg
θ
sxgb tttP
ttt
G
ttt
t  
( ) ( )djsxgr jtjtjtj +++−∞ −−+− ∫0 1  and thus the sustainable fiscal debt is equal to the present 
value of primary balances discounted by the interest rate, as in the model in Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986). Hence, the argument in Hamilton and Flavin (1986) describes a special case of 
my model such that PG θθ = . In other words, the conventional model implicitly assumes a 
non-inflationary environment such that PG θθ = . 
     Equation (13) questions the appropriateness of Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) fiscal 
sustainability test of the hypothesis ( ) ( )djsxgrb jtjtjtjt +++−∞∗ −−+−= ∫0 1 . This kind of test 
may be valid if PG θθ =  (i.e., if in a non-inflationary environment), but equation (13) indicates 
                                                          
21 In a deflationary environment (i.e., PG θθ < ), the sustainable fiscal debt is more than the present value of 
primary balances discounted by the interest rate such that 
P
ttt
G
ttt
t θ
sxg
θ
sxgb −−−>−−−=∗ . 
 21
that in an inflationary environment such that PG θθ > , satisfying the equation 
( ) ( )djsxgrb jtjtjtjt +++−∞∗ −−+−= ∫0 1  does not guarantee fiscal sustainability. To claim 
fiscal sustainability in an inflationary environment, the equation 
( ) ( )djsxgθb jtjtjtjGt +++−∞∗ −−+−= ∫0 1  instead needs to be satisfied and thereby we need 
information on the time preference rate of government rather than the real interest rate to judge 
fiscal sustainability. This discount factor problem may not be serious when this kind of test is 
applied to most developed countries where inflation is currently very low, but it may be more 
important when this kind of test is applied to some developing countries where even now high 
inflation is endemic. In those countries, even if fiscal sustainability is validated by Hamilton and 
Flavin’s (1986) test, debts may not be sustainable in reality. 
     The discount factor problem in Hamilton and Flavin’s test has also been raised from 
another point of view. Bohn (1995) criticizes it for not considering stochastic environments and 
argues that, in a stochastic environment, the discount factor cannot be represented by the real 
interest rate but rather by the marginal rate of substitution. Tests using arbitrarily selected real 
interest rates are therefore inappropriate. This paper raises another important problem regarding 
the choice of discount factor. Even in a deterministic environment, the real interest rate is not 
the appropriate discount factor if the environment is deterministic and inflationary.  
 
2. The interrelation between debt and inflation 
     Many empirical studies analyzing the relation between government debt and inflation 
assume a simple linear relation between them.22 My model indicates, however, that the relation 
between the level of government debt and the inflation rate is not linear and is much more 
complex because the level of government debt and the acceleration of inflation depend 
                                                          
22 Particularly, the FTPL predicts that fiscal deficits cause inflation.  
 22
commonly on Gθ . For example, equations (11) and (13) indicate that a situation such that 
0=tb&  while 0≠tπ&  is possible. Many empirical studies indicate that the relation between 
the level of government debt and the inflation rate is unclear and inconclusive.23  This 
inconclusiveness may be due to the incorrect assumption that the relation between the two is 
linear.  
     Equation (13) also suggests an interesting aspect of the interrelation between government 
debt and inflation. Assume that initially PG θθ =  but Gθ  is unexpectedly raised to be G#θ  at 
a time and thus, after that time, PG# θθ > . This unexpected surprise upward shift of the time 
preference rate of government has interesting consequences. First, inflation starts to accelerate 
by equation (11) because, as was shown in the section III, equation (11) cannot be held without 
the acceleration of inflation if PG# θθ > . Secondly, the real value of sustainable government 
bonds 
G
ttt
t θ
sxgb −−−=∗  is shifted to be G#
#
t
#
t
#
t*#
t θ
sxgb −−−=  where both the sustainable fiscal 
debt and steady state primary balance are smaller than before such that *t
*#
t bb <  and 
( ) ( )ttt#t#t#t sxgsxg −−−<−−− . The downward shifts of the sustainable fiscal debt and steady 
state primary balance are analogous to those of capital stock and consumption in the Ramsey 
model on the private economy. Government debt ∗tb  corresponds to the capital stock in the 
Ramsey model. The primary balance ( )ttt sxg −−−  corresponds to consumption in the 
Ramsey model. Finally, the time preference rate of government Gθ  that equals the real return 
on government bonds at steady state as was shown in equation (12) corresponds to the time 
preference rate of the representative household that equals the real interest rate at steady state in 
the Ramsey model. As both steady state capital and consumption shift downwards in the 
Ramsey model if the time preference rate of the representative household shifts upwards, both 
                                                          
23 See, for example, Karras (1994), Darrat (2000), or Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (2002). 
 23
steady state government debt and primary balance shift downwards if the time preference rate of 
government shifts upwards. As a result, *t
*#
t bb <  and ( ) ( )ttt#t#t#t sxgsxg −−−<−−−  when 
Gθ  shifts upwards such that PG# θθ > . Because market participants know this mechanism and 
thus nobody buy these bonds in markets unless the real value of government bonds has 
sufficiently fallen in this environment of accelerating inflation, the real value of already issued 
government bonds soon falls from ∗tb  to 
*#
tb . 
     If the time preference rate of government is unexpectedly raised, therefore, households 
will experience double suffering, namely, from accelerating inflation and from the loss of the 
value of government bonds they hold. On the other hand, the government gains by the 
unexpected upward shift of Gθ  because steady state primary balance that the government is 
obligated to achieve in the future becomes smaller. This mechanism may tempt a government 
into raising Gθ  to lessen the burden of debts, although this action also accelerates inflation. 
 
3. The concept of fiscal sustainability in an inflationary environment 
     Another important contribution of this paper is that the concept of fiscal sustainability is 
extended to an inflationary environment. Although the deficit financing of government has been 
regarded as interacting with the development of inflation, the conventional theory on fiscal 
sustainability has not considered this aspect but rather limited analyses to economic activities in 
the real term. On the other hand, the FTPL argues this point explicitly and contends that the 
price level is closely related to fiscal factors, but the FTPL has been criticized for merely 
arguing a curious possibility of fiscal sustainability. The model presented here, however, is 
fundamentally different from both of these models. Neither government (which represents the 
political desire of people) nor the representative household (which represents the economic 
desire of people) dominates the other because political and economic desires are balanced. The 
government determines fiscal policies and the representative household adjusts prices in the 
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simultaneous optimization of government and the representative household. As a result, fiscal 
policy and inflation are determined simultaneously in the model, which makes detailed analyses 
on the interrelation between them possible, and the concept of fiscal sustainability can be 
extended to an inflationary environment. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
     A model that incorporates government’s non-absurd borrowing behavior is constructed by 
explicitly including the political utility function of an economically Leviathan government in 
order to analyze fiscal sustainability in an inflationary environment. In the model, both behavior 
of government and development of inflation are determined through the simultaneous 
optimization of government and the representative household. The concept of fiscal 
sustainability is extended to an inflationary environment by the model. The model is therefore 
fundamentally different from models based on the FTPL or the quantity theory of money 
because both the economic and political utility of people are considered.  
     The main finding of the paper is that the sustainable fiscal debt is equal to the present 
value of primary balances discounted by the time preference rate of government. The 
sustainable fiscal debt is therefore less than the present value of primary balances discounted by 
the interest rate in an inflationary environment. This result questions the appropriateness of the 
fiscal sustainability test developed by Hamilton and Flavin (1986). The problem of the fiscal 
sustainability test appears very important, particularly when studying fiscal sustainability in 
developing countries where high inflation is still endemic. The model also indicates that the 
relation between the level of government debt and the inflation rate is not linear. The relation 
between them is unclear and inconclusive in empirical studies, possibly because the relation is 
wrongly assumed to be linear. In addition, the model indicates that a government gains by 
deliberately making inflation accelerate because the steady state primary balance decreases. 
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This mechanism may tempt a government into accelerating inflation to lessen the burden of its 
debts. 
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